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Philosophy for Children (P4C) is an educational program founded by Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp in the 
1970s to improve judgment in children by sharpening their critical, creative, and caring thinking skills. As 
children’s engagement in philosophical dialogue is an essential component of the program, the teacher has a 
facilitative, rather than an instructive, role. The goal of this paper is to provide new and experienced facilitators 
with conceptual tools for critically reflecting on and improving their facilitative practice. The paper first 
develops a Vygotskian interpretation of P4C facilitation, applying Vygotsky’s theory to P4C’s Community of 
Philosophical Inquiry structure and David Kennedy’s “toolbox of philosophical moves.” We contend that 
Vygotsky’s sociocultural theory provides a useful lens through which to view facilitation as assisted or mediated 
learning. The concept of facilitation as mediational assistance is then extended by drawing on Gallimore and 
Tharp’s neo-Vygotskian framework and their six means of assistance. Finally, we further extend these ideas by 
turning to Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor. Metaphors expand the “facilitator’s toolbox” 
by providing additional conceptual tools for facilitation as well as varied ways to conceptualize the facilitation 
process through a Vygotskian lens. 
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hilosophy for Children is an educational program founded by Matthew Lipman and Ann 
Sharp in the 1970s to improve judgment in children by sharpening their critical, creative, 
and caring thinking skills (Lipman, 1998, 2003; Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1980; Splitter & Sharp, 
1995). These skills are sharpened by engaging students in philosophical dialogues, during what the 
program calls a Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CPI), or in other philosophical activities and 
discussion plans (Gregory, 2008; Lipman, 1996b; Oyler, 2016). Lipman and Sharp theorized that 
dialogic philosophical engagement would encourage children (as young as kindergarteners) to think 
for themselves, think with others, and think well (Gregory, 2011; Kennedy, 2000).   
  
As dialogue is an essential component of the CPI, the teacher has a facilitative rather than an 
instructive role (Lipman et al., 1980). The program has emphasized the importance of the teacher’s 
modeling of good critical reasoning for students. The teacher’s role has also been conceptualized as a 
Socratic questioner (Splitter & Sharp, 1995) and “co-inquirer” (Gregory, 2008). More recently, 
Kennedy (2013) has further explicated the facilitator’s role and introduced what he calls a “toolbox of 
philosophical moves.” These moves are a set of critical reasoning tools to be modeled by facilitators 
and identified as they occur in students’ on-going conversations. Ideally, as students internalize and 
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master the use of these moves, the facilitative role will be dispersed across the community and the 
students will eventually become capable of managing the dialogue on their own (Gregory, 2007; 
Kennedy, 2004; Oyler, 2016).  
 
In this paper, we provide a Vygotskian perspective of facilitation within a Lipman-Sharp 
approach to Philosophy for Children (P4C). As a developmental psychologist, Lev Vygotsky studied 
the social and cultural origins of higher mental processes. In Vygotsky’s theory, cognitive development 
occurs as individuals learn the use of cultural tools, with the help of more skilled cultural members. In 
other words, for Vygotsky, development occurs through assisted or facilitated learning. As a result of 
this emphasis, Vygotsky’s theory can provide a valuable lens through which to view facilitation in P4C. 
Lipman (1996a), in his book, Natasha: Vygotskian Dialogues, addressed some connections between 
Vygotsky and P4C. However, Lipman did not focus specifically on Vygotsky’s relevance to facilitators. 
The goal of this paper is to provide a Vygotskian interpretation of P4C facilitation that expands and 
deepens our understanding of the facilitator’s role. We aim to provide P4C facilitators with 
conceptual tools for critical reflection as they strive to improve their facilitative practice. This may be 
especially helpful for new facilitators. 
 
The paper is organized in two main sections. In the first section, we develop a Vygotskian 
interpretation of P4C facilitation. After an overview of Vygotsky’s sociocultural theory, we apply his 
key concepts to the Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CPI) and Kennedy’s philosophical moves. 
The concept of facilitation as mediational assistance is then extended by drawing on Gallimore and 
Tharp’s neo-Vygotskian framework and their six means of assistance. In the second section, we further 
extend these ideas by turning to Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor. Our purpose 
for including this work on metaphor is twofold. First, metaphors provide facilitators additional 
conceptual tools for assisting student learning from a Vygotskian perspective. Second, several 
metaphors for facilitation or assistance have emerged within neo-Vygotskian sociocultural theories 
that offer varied ways of understanding the process of facilitation itself. In both cases, metaphors can 
further expand the “facilitator’s toolbox.” 
 
Vygotsky’s Sociocultural Theory and P4C 
 
Vygotsky’s sociocultural theory provides a useful lens through which to view and deepen our 
understanding of P4C facilitation. In this section, we focus on three Vygotskian concepts: mediation, 
internalization, and the zone of proximal development. The idea of facilitation as mediational 
assistance is then extended through the neo-Vygotskian framework of Gallimore and Tharp (1990), 
who outlined six specific means of assistance. When applied to P4C, these theories can help 
facilitators better critically reflect on their practice and assist student learning within the community 
of philosophical inquiry.   
 
Vygotsky’s Sociocultural Theory of Development 
 
Lev Vygotsky, a Russian developmental psychologist from the early twentieth century, sought to 
understand human psychological processes in terms of their origins. Specifically, he studied how 
elementary mental processes (those we share with other animals) are transformed into more complex 





higher mental functions (e.g., voluntary attention and memory, thinking and reasoning, self-
regulation). According to Vygotsky (1978), this occurs through mediation involving the use of signs or 
psychological tools (e.g., language, number systems) produced within a culture. Whereas in a reflex, a 
stimulus directly triggers a response, with mediation a third entity (e.g., a tool or sign) transforms this 
relation and expands our capabilities. For example, counting on one’s fingers was an important 
cultural tool for extending quantitative perception. Signs mediate perception and action as physical 
tools mediate labor. However, rather than being directed outward (toward the world), signs are 
directed inward (toward ourselves). Other examples of cultural tools include memory strategies, 
diagrams, maps, and algebraic systems (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1985).  
 
Vygotsky (1978) argued signs allow for the voluntary control of behavior and mental processes. 
Internalization involves the internal production of a sign to mediate perception or action. In 
Vygotsky’s view, all higher mental functions begin as social processes. In his law of cultural 
development, the individual (internal) plane emerges from the social (external) plane: “Every function 
in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual 
level” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 57). For example, first we point things out to others, then later we are able 
to point things out to ourselves (the basis of voluntary attention). According to Vygotsky, thinking is 
transformed as language, thinking strategies, and other cultural tools are internalized—that is, they 
become internal and private, directed toward oneself, incorporated into existing mental processes, and 
regulated by the individual. 
  
For Vygotsky (1978, 1986), speech played an essential role in the development of children’s 
thinking. Speech is first used to communicate with others—to express desires, make requests, and 
describe situations. It gradually comes to organize the individual’s perception and action. For young 
children, the primary function of speech is labeling, allowing them to focus on a specific object or 
aspect of their perceptual field. As Vygotsky (1978) described, through this “verbalized perception” 
they learn to perceive the world as objects with meaning: “The child begins to perceive the world not 
only through his eyes but also through his speech” (p. 32). Gradually speech becomes more planful. 
Children tend to speak as well as act when trying to reach a goal. At first, speech tends to follow or 
accompany action, but it eventually moves earlier in the process to precede action (in the form of a 
plan). Speech also shifts from being external to internal. Children first talk to others, then to 
themselves out loud, and finally to themselves internally (as inner thought or “private speech”). 
Whereas other developmental psychologists at the time viewed kids talking out loud to themselves 
negatively (for Piaget, this “egocentric speech” was a sign of immaturity), Vygotsky considered this an 
important step in the internalization process through which children develop the capacity to engage in 
dialogue with themselves. This emerging planning function of speech enables children to first master 
their environments and eventually regulate their own behavior (Vygotsky, 1978). 
 
For Vygotsky, cognitive development is social in two ways: (a) it is mediated by sociocultural 
tools and (b) it occurs through social assistance (Wertsch, 1985). Vygotsky (1978) introduced the zone 
of proximal development (ZPD) to describe the relationship between assisted learning and 
development. He defined the ZPD as “the distance between the actual developmental level as 
determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined 
through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers” 





(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). With regard to instruction, the ZPD represents competencies not yet 
mastered but which the individual is able to perform effectively with assistance. In other words, it 
defines what an individual cannot do alone but can do with help. This is where instruction or 
assistance should be targeted, as it is where learning can lead development forward. For example, if 
students already know multiplication, exponents can be explained as the same number multiplied by 
itself X number of times. Eventually, children will be able to use this strategy themselves. 
Development occurs as children participate in cultural activities just beyond their level of competence 
and learn how to use cultural tools with the assistance of more skilled adults or peers.  
 
Applying Vygotsky: P4C “Moves” and the CPI Structure 
 
A Vygotskian framework can be used to conceptualize effective facilitation within Philosophy for 
Children. Here we focus on interpreting Kennedy’s “philosophical moves” and the CPI through a 
Vygotskian lens. Kennedy (2013) has provided P4C facilitators and participants a set of tools for 
inquiry he calls “philosophical moves.” These moves are strategies for engaging in critical reasoning 
and philosophical dialogue. Specifically, Kennedy has identified the following philosophical moves: 
“asking a question”; “agreeing or disagreeing”; “giving a reason”; “offering a proposition, hypothesis or 
explanation”; “offering an example or counterexample”; “classifying/categorizing”; “making a 
comparison” (i.e., a connection, distinction, or analogy); “offering a definition”; “identifying an 
assumption”; “making an inference”; “making a conditional statement (‘if/then’)”; “reasoning 
syllogistically”; “self-correcting”; “restating”; and “entertaining different perspectives” (see Kennedy, 
2013, for a description of each). According to Kennedy, these moves should be modeled by facilitators 
and identified as they occur naturally in conversation. As students learn to identify and use these 
moves, the facilitator’s role is reduced (ideally, for Kennedy, it disappears) and control is distributed 
across the group (Kennedy, 2004, 2013).  
 
Through a Vygotskian lens, these moves serve as mediational tools that can be used first as 
category labels and then for planning and regulating social and internal processes. By identifying 
critical reasoning moves already spontaneously produced in students’ conversations, facilitators make 
them a focus of conscious attention. As facilitators model the use of these moves to guide discussion, 
they mediate inquiry on the “social plane.” Note that what is being facilitated here is the critical 
reasoning and dialogue processes, not their content; the P4C facilitator does not lead students toward 
any particular discussion topic, belief, or conclusion. As students begin (with the help of the facilitator 
and later their peers) to see the conversation in terms of the categorical framework provided by the 
moves, the facilitator can more easily direct students’ attention to aspects of group conversation and 
help them develop a greater understanding of the moves. Eventually, the moves will be more planned, 
as students call for various moves from others and, when internalized, from themselves.  
 
In order to best support this process, facilitators should target students’ zones of proximal 
development. At first, assistance will be more explicit, as students need to have the moves identified or 
modeled and the facilitator may need to call for specific moves. With practice, students should be able 
to provide more help to each other and eventually themselves, so that the facilitator only needs to 
intervene when conversation “gets stuck” or when alternative moves could push the conversation to a 
deeper level. As students internalize the moves and increasingly regulate their own critical reasoning 





and dialogue processes, they will need facilitation less and less, and control of the conversation will be 
increasingly distributed across the group. When this occurs, teachers should be ready to make two 
adjustments: (a) facilitation should be aimed at higher levels of skill and (b) the teacher’s role should 
shift from facilitator to co-inquirer.  
 
According to Oyler’s (2016) analysis of the Lipman-Sharp approach to P4C, the CPI has the 
following parts: engaging with a stimulus, student-generated question, inquiry dialogue, and metacognitive 
reflection (we will not focus here on post-CPI activities). The stimulus is any philosophically charged 
experience from which students can develop questions. Lipman and Sharp wrote several novels 
designed for this role (e.g., Lipman, 1981), but alternative stimuli include picture books, short video 
clips, or even the classroom itself. The questions developed from the stimulus need to be 
philosophical in order to be useful for inquiry; they should be communal (appropriate for group 
discussion), central (meaningful to the group), and contestable (with more than one possible answer; 
Gregory, 2008). Examples of good inquiry questions include “Is it wrong to lie to your friend if you 
are trying to protect them?” and “Would it ever be just to kill someone?” As students engage in 
inquiry, the result is typically not a finished or correct answer. Rather, through inquiry, students aim 
to identify a “most reasonable thing to believe” or a hypothesis that must be tested or considered 
further (Lipman et al., 1980; Reznitskaya & Wilkinson, 2017). In the final metacognitive reflection, 
students assess their own thinking and group process: “Are we doing a good job listening to other 
participants? How can we improve our thinking in the future? Are we examining multiple 
perspectives?” (Lipman, 2003; Oyler, 2016). These questions are designed to encourage students’ 
mindfulness about their thinking and inquiry processes and hopefully also promote a self-corrective 
attitude (Gregory, 2008; Lipman, 2003). For example, if students indicate they are not doing a good 
job examining multiple perspectives, the facilitator can ask them how they could address this issue 
moving forward. Importantly, this leaves the responsibility with students to identify problems and 
implement solutions.  
 
In Vygotskian terms, the CPI framework provides a cultural tool that mediates the social process 
of initiating and engaging in philosophical conversations. This structure allows participants to know 
how to ask and answer philosophical questions within a group. If later internalized, individuals have a 
framework for asking and answering questions on their own. For example, while at home watching a 
television show with a philosophically charged scene, they may develop their own questions, engage in 
internal inquiry (using the moves), and determine an answer that works for them. This aligns with the 
program’s goal of helping students think for themselves and think well.  
 
The CPI also attempts to help students internalize metacognition as a mediation tool. Originally 
done as a group at the end of inquiry, the hope is that students will apply this metacognitive reflection 
to other experiences. For example, after writing a paper or taking a test, students could ask themselves, 
“Did I choose good strategies in writing that paper?” or “Did I prepare well for that test?” followed by 
“How could I improve in the future?” This can help students better plan, monitor, and control their 
thinking and learning processes (see Flavell, 1979; Nelson, 1996). In all these examples, facilitators 
provide conceptual tools, aimed at the ZPD, that assist students’ social interactions and eventually 
(when internalized) their internal “conversations” with themselves. To further develop a Vygotskian 
understanding of facilitation as mediational assistance, in the next section we turn to a neo-





Vygotskian framework developed by Ronald Gallimore and Roland Tharp.  
 
Extending Vygotsky: Gallimore and Tharp’s Means of Assisting Performance  
 
Gallimore and Tharp (1990; Tharp & Gallimore, 1988) introduced an approach to teaching 
literacy, based on Vygotsky’s ideas, in which teaching is viewed as assisting performance and literacy is 
developed through “instructional conversations.” They have challenged traditional conceptions of 
teaching as lecture and recitation, where teachers control the topics of discussion as well as the form 
and timing of student responses. In their instructional conversations, they weave together experiences 
and concepts, engaging learners in meaningful discourse that provides a context for assisting 
performance.  
 
In this paper, Gallimore and Tharp’s work is important for its further development of methods 
for providing assistance. Of most relevance here, they outline six means (or forms) of assistance that 
integrate ideas from several psychological perspectives (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, social cognitive) 
within a broader neo-Vygotskian framework. These six means of assistance are modeling, contingency 
management, feedback, instructing, questioning, and cognitive structuring. In this educational model, 
learning is facilitated as assistance occurs within a student’s ZPD. As students eventually internalize 
these means of assistance, there is a shift from assisted (or other-regulated) to self-regulated 
performance. In what follows, each means of assistance is described and examples are offered that 
connect it to effective facilitation in P4C. 
 
Modeling is the act of performing a behavior or task for the purpose of imitation. This can occur 
intentionally or unintentionally (Gallimore & Tharp, 1990). In P4C, Lipman’s novels model critical, 
creative, and caring thinking (De Marzio, 2017). The facilitator is also constantly modeling in the CPI. 
For example, during the question forming stage, if participants do not understand what kinds of 
questions are appropriate for philosophical conversation, the facilitator can provide examples. When 
a facilitator identifies or calls for a specific move, this models the use of that move. Metacognition can 
also be modeled by facilitators, as they lead discussions that evaluate the session and consider 
improvements. Facilitators should be careful not to model undesired behaviors (e.g., being upset or 
defensive when someone disagrees with your idea). As students develop their P4C moves, they can 
also serve as models for each other. 
 
         Contingency management is often described in terms of reinforcement and punishment. Teachers 
should align contingencies (i.e., consequences of behaviors) with their goals, such that desired 
behaviors are reinforced and undesired behaviors are not reinforced. In school, grades serve as 
important contingencies. Other potential reinforcers include praise, recognition, preferred activities, 
and opportunities for desired choice or participation. In the CPI, the most common reinforcers used 
in on-going conversations are praise and recognition. The P4C facilitator can praise or recognize 
students for appropriately identifying and using moves, asking good questions, or making good 
arguments. Although punishment (e.g., criticism) may occur, reinforcement is preferred in both the 
psychological and P4C literatures.  
 





         Feedback provides information on performance in relation to a standard or goal (Gallimore & 
Tharp, 1990). Common forms of feedback in school are grades, test corrections, rubrics, teacher 
comments, and peer evaluations. Within P4C, the CPI creates a context where students receive a 
constant stream of feedback, as they offer ideas or employ moves and observe the responses of others 
(e.g., Do others understand what I said? Did it move the conversation forward? Do others agree?). As 
students learn the characteristics of good critical reasoning and dialogue, along with the appropriate 
use of the P4C moves, these provide standards relative to which individuals can compare their 
performance and make improvements. For example, questions can be evaluated as to whether they are 
communal, central, and contestable (Gregory, 2008). All CPI participants can contribute group 
feedback during the metacognition stage. 
 
         In Gallimore and Tharp’s framework, instructing has the specific meaning of telling an individual 
what to do (i.e., how to think or behave). In the CPI, there is not a lot of direct instructing. The first 
few sessions may include instruction as to the kinds of questions that are useful for inquiry and, 
depending on the age range of the group, certain etiquette guidelines may be necessary and students’ 
attention may occasionally need to be directed back to the appropriate task. However, in part, P4C 
distinguishes itself from traditional teaching in its emphasis on other forms of assistance. When 
instruction is used, it should be selected because it is determined to be the best form of assistance, not 
as a means for the facilitator (as expert or authority) to take control of the conversation or direct the 
group toward certain topics or conclusions. 
 
Questioning has a distinct role as a means of assistance, in that it “provokes creations by the 
pupil” (Gallimore & Tharp, 1990, p. 181). This enables teachers and facilitators to assist learning in 
several important ways. First, it stimulates students’ thinking. Second, as students offer a linguistic 
response, it provides access to their thoughts, allowing facilitators to assess and further assist their 
thinking and understanding. Third, it models questioning, which can support its eventual 
internalization as self-questioning. Questioning has a central role in P4C. The CPI is based on 
complex questions like “What is a democracy?” or “What makes someone a good friend?” that 
stimulate critical, creative, and caring thinking. As conversations develop, there are further 
opportunities for the facilitator and students to ask questions to gain access to other participants’ 
thoughts. This provides a context for clarifying statements, generating alternative ideas, evaluating 
arguments, and promoting metacognitive reflection.  
 
Finally, cognitive structuring involves providing a mental structure for understanding perceptions 
and experiences or structuring thoughts and actions (Gallimore & Tharp, 1990). Cognitive structures 
can include concepts, examples, unifying principles, conceptual frameworks, theories, philosophies, 
evaluative standards, procedures, and strategies. In P4C, students gain useful concepts from shared 
readings and conversations with each other. At select times, the facilitator may offer an example, 
concept, or strategy to advance the conversation. Venn diagrams can be introduced to help students 
understand relations between categories (Kennedy, 2013). The P4C moves and CPI structure also 
provide examples of cognitive structuring that can assist facilitators and students in planning and 
evaluating their critical reasoning and dialogue. The next section will further extend this idea of 
cognitive structuring via Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor.  
 





Thus, Gallimore and Tharp’s six means of assistance offer facilitators a range of options to select 
from when assisting students. This “meta-framework” itself provides cognitive structuring for 
facilitators, as they engage in and metacognitively reflect on how they can improve their practice. 
Modeling is central to P4C, and many P4C contributors have stressed the modeling and identification 
of various moves in the CPI (De Marzio, 2017; Gregory, 2007, 2008; Kennedy, 2013; Lipman et al., 
1980; Splitter & Sharp, 1995). Gallimore and Tharp’s framework can assist facilitators when 
considering how to combine modeling with other forms of assistance. If combined with questioning 
(i.e., asking the group what move was just used), this may help students later identify moves on their 
own (i.e., asking themselves, “what move was that?”). A facilitator could also provide or ask for 
feedback on the group’s use of the moves (e.g., “Did we disagree with any positions today? Did we ask 
for clarification when needed?”). As students use and identify moves, facilitators can manage 
contingencies by providing some encouraging praise or recognition (e.g., “good example”; “thank you 
for clarifying that point”). Moreover, when a group is struggling with part of the program, a little 
instruction (e.g., directing students to try a specific move) or cognitive structuring (e.g., offering an 
example) may help move the conversation forward without negatively impacting the overall 
collaborative nature of the group. By using varied means of assistance, the facilitator is also modeling 
their use, which means that the group may begin using them. Although none of these specific 
strategies may be new to P4C, this meta-framework can hopefully assist facilitators by cognitively 
structuring their thinking about their own performance, thus helping them better assist student 
learning.  
 
Metaphors for Cognitive Structuring in P4C 
 
To further develop a neo-Vygotskian approach to P4C facilitation, and extend the idea of 
assistance via cognitive structuring discussed above, this section draws on George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor. Although Lakoff and Johnson do not directly connect their 
ideas to Vygotsky’s work, we argue that metaphors can provide a further source of mediation within a 
Vygotskian conceptualization of facilitation that has relevance for P4C. Below, we first introduce key 
concepts from Lakoff and Johnson’s theory relating to the role of metaphor in human thought. Then, 
we illustrate the potential value of metaphors for cognitive structuring by offering examples of 
metaphors that could facilitate P4C inquiry, followed by examples of metaphors from neo-Vygotskian 
theories that are useful for conceptualizing the facilitation process itself. This combines ideas from the 
first author’s training and experiences as a P4C facilitator and the second author’s prior analysis of 
metaphors underlying sociocultural theories (Clark, 2005). Our goal is to provide facilitators 
additional conceptual tools to expand their “toolbox” and increase their capacity for critical reflection 
on the facilitation process.  
 
Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 2003) have extensively studied the role of metaphor in human 
cognition. In traditional views, metaphor has been considered a linguistic device, a form of figurative 
language, useful for poetry and rhetoric but not central to everyday cognition and to be avoided by 
philosophers and scientists in search of precise definitions and literal truths. In contrast, Lakoff and 
Johnson have argued metaphor is common, ordinary, and fundamentally conceptual; metaphorical 





language is often derivative of (and provides evidence for) this pervasive role of metaphor in human 
thought and understanding.  
 
Conceptual metaphor theory is a central part of a broader embodied view of mind. Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999, 2003) have explored how many of our concepts and forms of reasoning have arisen, 
often through metaphor, from our sensorimotor experiences and ways of interacting in the world 
(e.g., object manipulation, orientation and motion in space). As defined by Lakoff and Johnson 
(2003), metaphor is the structuring of one experiential or conceptual domain in terms of another. 
This typically involves using a well-structured (often sensorimotor) source domain to understand and 
reason about a less-structured (often abstract) target domain. We are usually unaware of the metaphors 
that enable and constrain our conceptualization and reasoning processes. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) 
have referred to our most basic metaphors, those that structure our conventional ways of thinking, as 
“metaphors we live by.”  
 
As an example, consider how discussions of arguments often reflect the language of war. We 
strive to defend our position, plan lines of attack, shoot down opposing ideas, and gain ground. According to 
Lakoff and Johnson (2003), this “argument is war” metaphor is more than a linguistic matter; we use 
not just the words but also the conceptual structure of war to think about arguments. An alternative 
(but also conventional) metaphor is “arguments are buildings” that can be well constructed, have strong 
support, or lack a firm foundation. Each metaphor partially structures the concept, highlighting some 
aspects of arguments but not others. Which metaphor we use influences how we think and act. 
Whereas the war metaphor draws attention to oppositional aspects, the building metaphor emphasizes 
the importance of foundational premises and evidentiary support. Those engaged in argument as war 
are likely aiming to win. In contrast, for those viewing arguments as buildings, the goal is likely to 
strengthen their support (e.g., to prevent a shaky argument’s collapse). When faced with objections, the 
former may defend their position, even deploying strategies that seem irrational (e.g., refusing to 
accommodate reasonable objections, constructing a fake “reality” in an attempt to remain “correct”), 
whereas the latter may welcome feedback on any structural defects in the argument.  
 
Another common metaphor in Western cultures is “time is a resource” and the more specific 
variation “time is money.” We use resources and money (as source domains) to structure our thinking 
about time (the target domain). We talk of saving, wasting, and running out of time (reflecting resources 
generally) and spending, budgeting, and investing time (reflecting money more specifically). To use 
Vygotskian terms, the resource and money domains mediate our understanding of time by helping to 
structure this more abstract concept. We also conceptualize time in terms of motion in space. Events 
such as deadlines can approach or pass us by (if time is moving relative to us) or we can look ahead to 
upcoming events we are fast approaching (if we are moving relative to a time landscape). As with the 
argument metaphors, each metaphor partially structures time. Time as a resource or money highlights 
its value and limited status, whereas time as motion in space emphasizes our changing temporal 
relations to events. There is no “true” or “right” metaphor that “captures” all of the concept’s available 
meaning. To fully understand a domain, we must rely on multiple metaphors, each emphasizing 
different aspects (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2003). 
 





Conventional metaphors are typically used automatically without effort, and we are usually 
unaware of their role in our thought processes. However, if we become aware of the metaphors we use 
(i.e., if we develop reflexivity), we can assess their strengths and limitations and use them more 
intentionally and self-critically. In addition, new metaphors (or new extensions of existing metaphors) 
can create new understanding (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2003). For metaphors, the relevant question 
is not whether they are true or false but if they are appropriate or inappropriate for use in a given 
situation. Moreover, considering multiple metaphors should be encouraged. Even if one metaphor fits 
our experiences or the evidence well, an alternative perspective could still be valuable in highlighting 
different aspects of the situation.  
 
Facilitating with Metaphors 
 
Integrating Lakoff and Johnson’s ideas into the neo-Vygotskian framework of facilitation as 
assistance developed in the previous section, conceptual metaphor provides another tool for 
facilitating learning through cognitive structuring. This section outlines two metaphors implemented 
in the first author’s experiences with P4C. For each, we explicate the metaphor and describe how it 
could help facilitators see aspects of the CPI they might otherwise have missed. These metaphors are 
merely offered as examples of possible ways to conceptualize aspects of the program. The list is far 
from exhaustive and identifying additional useful metaphors could be one potential avenue for future 
projects. Our goal here is to illustrate the potential role of metaphor within a neo-Vygotskian 
interpretation of facilitation.   
 
The first metaphor, arguments are houses, assumes that arguments have parts: the claim or 
hypothesis, the premises or reasons, and the assumptions or grounding on which those premises rely. 
The claim represents the roof of the house, which needs to be supported by walls (i.e., premises or 
reasons). A typical reason will assume something, which means it is grounded in prior beliefs or 
knowledge claims. This grounding is the house’s foundation. Just as a house’s weak foundation or 
walls could threaten the roof, weaknesses in (or objections to) the underlying assumptions or 
supporting reasons, if not addressed, could cause a shaky argument to collapse.  
 
This “arguments are houses” metaphor can be useful in helping facilitators and participants 
construct and critique arguments. If a student presents a hypothesis (i.e., a roof) without providing 
reasons (i.e., walls) to support it, then the facilitator can call for those reasons. Eventually, this way of 
seeing arguments, as well as this move, will be internalized by the participants and the facilitator will 
no longer need to call for other features of the house/argument. Objections are easier to understand 
through the house metaphor as well. For example, if an objection is presented, students may assume a 
claim is indefensible. However, if the facilitator can help them identify and amend the weak feature, 
they may see that the claim is still defensible. This metaphor highlights that knowledge construction is 
an active process and there is often value in collaborative efforts. Variations on this metaphor are 
found in Reznitskaya and Wilkinson (2017). Note that it is also consistent with the “arguments are 
buildings” metaphor identified by Lakoff and Johnson (2003).  
 
A second metaphor, communities are organisms, highlights that a classroom community such as the 
CPI takes time to develop, just as an organism takes time to grow. Also, like an organism, a 





community is comprised of interrelated parts that must work together for the successful functioning 
of the whole. Kennedy’s (1994, 2004) ideas align with this metaphor, when he has argued good 
participants notice where and when they are most needed in the group conversation. Contributions 
that distract from the current discussion thread might need to be withheld, a personal sacrifice for the 
benefit of the larger community. A community also has certain needs for the parts to function well, 
and, just as different organisms have similar needs (e.g., nutrients, shelter), many of the community 
members’ needs (e.g., being listened to and respected) are shared across communities.  
 
The “communities are organisms” metaphor emphasizes that all parts make an important 
contribution to and must work together for the effective functioning of the whole. Thus, this 
metaphor implies the community must care for and value the contributions of each individual. This 
can help facilitators emphasize the importance of caring thinking. When a participant who rarely 
contributes attempts to do so, the facilitator may intervene to ensure this participant gets an 
opportunity to be heard. In addition to other common caring behaviors, such as using the 
participants’ names or preventing interruptions, a facilitator cares for the group by keeping them 
focused on their goals. This includes the goal of finding the most reasonable answer, as well as other 
goals set by the group such as improved participation or better listening. In sum, thinking of 
communities as organisms, or arguments as houses, may enable facilitators and participants to think 
in new ways about critical reasoning and dialogue in the CPI. 
 
Metaphors of Facilitation 
 
Vygotsky and other sociocultural theories align well with P4C because of the central importance 
they place on processes of facilitation or assistance. In this section, we briefly describe three metaphors 
of facilitation consistent with a Vygotskian perspective, emphasizing what aspects of assistance each 
metaphor highlights. As discussed above, multiple metaphors expand our understanding of a 
conceptual domain. These metaphors provide different ways for P4C facilitators to understand their 
practice, enabling greater critical reflection on how they can best support and guide their students in 
developing philosophical competencies.  
  
Scaffolding. One of the most common metaphors used in sociocultural (neo-Vygotskian) 
approaches, especially in the educational and developmental literatures, is assistance as scaffolding. 
Vygotsky did not actually introduce the concept of scaffolding; its first use is typically credited to 
Wood, Bruner, and Ross (1976). Nevertheless, this metaphor has become closely associated with a 
sociocultural approach due to its fit with Vygotsky’s ideas. In this scaffolding metaphor, competencies 
are viewed as constructed objects and learning and development as processes of construction. In the 
source domain of building construction, scaffolding provides assistance. It is erected as needed for 
construction but then is removed when no longer needed. More specifically, Greenfield (1984) 
identified five features of scaffolding drawn from construction: “it provides a support; it functions as a 
tool; it extends the range of the worker; it allows the worker to accomplish a task not otherwise 
possible; and it is used selectively to aid the worker where needed” (p. 118). With scaffolding, builders 
can build, and learners can learn, what would otherwise not be possible without the temporary 
assistance. 
 





The strength of the scaffolding metaphor is specifically this focus on the role of assistance in 
learning and development. Rather than taking a teacher-centered perspective, this metaphor focuses 
on facilitated learning. It can help P4C facilitators focus their attention on the ZPD and the what, 
when, and how of assistance. What should facilitators assist? Assist students with aspects of 
philosophical conversations and thinking (process, not content) they cannot yet do alone but can do 
with help. When should facilitators assist? Assist students until help is no longer needed, or adjust help 
to match a student’s expanding ZPD (the facilitator’s role should fade or even disappear as students 
internalize these processes). Finally, how should facilitators assist? Assist students in specific ways 
(matched to their individual needs) that help them advance toward greater mastery (as they internalize 
these forms of assistance). Gallimore and Tharp’s means of assistance and the P4C moves provide 
many scaffolding options to consider.  
 
Guided participation. A second facilitation metaphor comes from the work of Barbara Rogoff 
(1990, 2003), who extended Vygotsky’s approach based on her own cross-cultural developmental 
research (e.g., in Mayan communities of Guatemala). Rogoff has conceptualized assistance as guided 
participation, where skilled cultural members guide children’s participation in culturally valued 
practices. This concept is based on viewing activities and development metaphorically as paths, with 
action as movement, goals (i.e., culturally-defined competencies) as destinations, and paths as ways of 
achieving them. However, Rogoff adds social elements to this path schema, in that the goals and paths 
are culturally defined and there are others with us on the path to guide us. Guidance involves 
providing direction (i.e., pointing individuals toward certain goals and away from others) and support 
(i.e., helping individuals move along the path). It can also involve “building bridges” to help 
individuals overcome obstacles as they move toward more advanced states (as locations), from 
incompetence to competence, from personal to shared meaning, and from other-assisted to self-
assisted action. As individuals develop, those guiding should transfer responsibility, so that the 
individuals being guided have increasing control over their actions (this is equivalent to removing the 
scaffolding when no longer needed). 
 
Guided participation, like scaffolding, highlights assistance (now framed as guidance). In P4C, 
facilitators can guide (direct and support) student participation in philosophical thinking and dialogue 
using the means of assistance and the P4C moves. However, this metaphor also directs attention to a 
couple additional elements. One criticism of the scaffolding metaphor is that it emphasizes the role of 
the adult (or more skilled other); the child (or one being assisted) is viewed passively (Rogoff, 1990). 
The guided participation metaphor gives the child a more active role in moving along developmental 
paths and in eliciting guidance. Applied to P4C, students and facilitators are active agents who 
interact with and influence each other. Facilitators should consider what interests and ideas students 
bring to the group and respond to how students engage with materials and others in the classroom. 
This requires flexibility in selecting means of assistance that respond to students’ proposed ideas in 
on-going activity. As students get sidetracked or encounter obstacles (e.g., “get stuck” over a 
definition), facilitators can help students move forward (e.g., identify the problem, consider alternative 
options). Students can also be encouraged to elicit guidance (e.g., modeling, feedback, cognitive 
structuring) from facilitators and peers. Finally, guided participation makes goals and students’ 
progress toward them more salient. In P4C, the goal state is not a particular conclusion but good 
critical reasoning. Facilitators can help the group clarify its goals (e.g., finding “the most reasonable 





answer”), track its progress, and understand why certain thinking and conversation practices are 
valued in P4C “culture.” 
 
Apprenticeship. A final metaphor for facilitation is apprenticeship. Using apprenticeship as a 
metaphor for cognitive development, Rogoff (1990) described children as “apprentices in thinking, 
active in their efforts to learn from observing and participating with peers and more skilled members 
of their society, developing skills to handle culturally defined problems with available tools, and 
building from these givens to construct new solutions within the context of sociocultural activity” (p. 
7). Rogoff (1991) offered four reasons why apprenticeship is an attractive metaphor: (a) apprentices 
and children actively observe, gather information about, and participate in activities around them; (b) 
their learning is structured by practices developed by older generations that involve the use of cultural 
tools to meet socially valued goals; (c) they are assisted through communication and involvement with 
more skilled partners (i.e., guided participation); and (d) they typically learn with others, both skilled 
practitioners and peers. Apprentices often develop considerable skills without traditional forms of 
instruction or examination. Learning is usually not defined in terms of teaching; the “curriculum” is 
not a detailed instructional plan but a set of opportunities for observation and participation in 
ongoing practice. Presented with the activity as a meaningful whole (rather than as decomposed parts), 
apprentices are usually motivated to develop competence in and contribute to valued practices (Lave 
& Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 1990, 1991).  
 
We believe these characteristics fit P4C well and highlight the importance of both facilitation 
and collaboration. Apprenticeships provide contexts for scaffolding and guided participation. In P4C, 
this highlights the importance of creating contexts (e.g., choosing stories and topics) that will engage 
students in meaningful conversations, where they can observe and participate with more skilled others 
who can provide scaffolding or guidance. Apprenticeship also emphasizes learning to use tools. In 
P4C, this involves developing competency in using the CPI structure and P4C moves. In Vygotsky’s 
terms, students first observe tool use in others, then use tools in conversations with others, and finally 
internalize this tool use to structure their own philosophical thinking (as internal philosophical 
conversations). As a final parallel between apprenticeships and P4C, apprentices often learn with 
peers, who can provide another source of guidance. In P4C, peers can assist each other as they engage 
in collaborative activity.  
Conclusion 
 
The central aim of this paper was to present a set of conceptual tools that could facilitate 
facilitation, that could provide scaffolding for the development of a broader and deeper 
understanding of the facilitation process. We pay tribute to the impactful work of Matthew Lipman, 
Ann Sharp, and David Kennedy in P4C. Through interpreting their key ideas, especially the 
Community of Philosophical Inquiry structure and Kennedy’s philosophical moves, through the lens 
of Vygotskian theory (supplemented by ideas from Gallimore and Tharp, Lakoff and Johnson, and 
Rogoff), our intent has been to provide useful conceptual tools for supporting philosophical 
conversations and students’ development of critical, creative, and caring thinking.  
 
As authors, although we have brought different academic backgrounds and experiences to this 
project, we share interests in philosophy, education, cognitive development, and effective thinking. 





We also share a concern with the lack of critical reasoning, deep understanding, and respectful 
dialogue we see in our society today and a belief in the importance of helping others (and ourselves) 
think collaboratively, think independently, and think well. Although we have discussed facilitation in 
the context of Philosophy for Children, we believe these theories and concepts are useful wherever 
effective thinking, dialogue, and collaboration can be guided and supported. As teachers, parents, 
neighbors, and citizens, we can use these same tools in promoting critical, creative, and caring 
thinking—in the classroom, at home, and in our communities. Today, more than ever, we are in need 
of thoughtful citizens who are able to join together with others in dialogue to explore deeply the 





Clark, K. M. (2005). An embodied cognitive analysis of social situativity (Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation). Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.  
De Marzio, D. (2017). Matthew Lipman’s model theory of the community of inquiry. Analytic Teaching 
and Philosophical Praxis, 38(1), 37-46.  
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive-developmental 
inquiry. American Psychologist, 34, 906-911.  
Gallimore, R., & Tharp, R. (1990). Teaching mind in society: Teaching, schooling, and literate 
discourse. In L. C. Moll (Ed.), Vygotsky and education (pp. 175-205). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Greenfield, P. M. (1984). A theory of the teacher in the learning activities of everyday life. In B. 
Rogoff & J. Lave (Eds.), Everyday cognition: Development in social context (pp. 117-138). 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Gregory, M. (2007). A framework for facilitating classroom dialogue. Teaching Philosophy, 30(1), 59-84. 
Gregory, M. (Ed.). (2008). Philosophy for children: Practitioner handbook. Montclair, NJ: Institute for the 
Advancement of Philosophy for Children. 
Gregory, M. (2011). Philosophy for children and its critics: A Mendham dialogue. Journal of Philosophy 
of Education, 45(2), 199-219.   
Kennedy, D. (1994). The five communities. Analytic Teaching, 15(1), 3-16.  
Kennedy, D. (2000). Thinking for oneself and with others. Analytic Teaching, 20(1), 40-45. 
Kennedy, D. (2004). The role of a facilitator in a community of philosophical inquiry. Metaphilosophy, 
35, 744-765. 
Kennedy, D. (2013). Developing philosophical facilitation: A toolbox of philosophical moves. In S. 
Goering, N. Shudak, & T. Wartenberg (Eds.), Philosophy in schools: An introduction for 
philosophers and teachers (pp. 110-119). New York: Routledge. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to Western 
thought. New York: Basic Books. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (2003). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lipman, M. (1981). Pixie. Montclair, NJ: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children.  





Lipman, M. (1996a). Natasha: Vygotskian dialogues. New York: Teachers College Press. 
Lipman, M. (1996b). Philosophical discussion plans and exercises. Analytic Teaching, 16(2), 64-77. 
Lipman, M. (1998). The contribution of philosophy to deliberative democracy. In D. Evans & I. 
Kuçaradi (Eds.), Teaching philosophy on the eve of the twenty-first century (pp. 6-29). Ankara: 
International Federation of Philosophical Societies.  
Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in education (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M., & Oscanyan, F. (1980). Philosophy in the classroom. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 
Nelson, T. O. (1996). Consciousness and metacognition. American Psychologist, 51, 102-116. 
Oyler, J. (2016). Philosophy with children: The Lipman-Sharp approach to philosophy for children. In 
M. A. Peters (Ed.), The encyclopedia of educational philosophy and theory (pp. 1-7). Singapore: 
Springer Science.  
Reznitskaya, A., & Wilkinson, I. (2017). The most reasonable answer: Helping students build better 
arguments together. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press. 
Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rogoff, B. (1991). Social interaction as apprenticeship in thinking: Guidance and participation in 
spatial planning. In L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine, & S. D. Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives on socially 
shared cognition (pp. 349-364). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Rogoff, B. (2003). The cultural nature of human development. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Splitter, L., & Sharp, A. (1995). Teaching for better thinking. Melbourne: Australian Council for 
Educational Research.   
Tharp, R. G., & Gallimore, R. (1988). Rousing minds to life: Teaching, learning, and schooling in social 
context. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes (M. Cole, V. John-
Steiner, S. Scribner, & E. Souberman, Eds. & Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language (A. Kozulin, Ed. & Tran.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Wertsch, J. V. (1985). Vygotsky and the social formation of mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Wood, D. J., Bruner, J. S., & Ross, G. (1976). The role of tutoring in problem solving. Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 17(2), 89-100. 
 
 
Address Correspondences to:  
Jacob B. Castleberry  
Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University  
1903 W. Michigan Ave, Kalamazoo, MI 49008  
Email: jacob.castleberry@wmich.edu 
 
